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Adoptable Property?:  
The Problem of Frozen Embryos and Ill-Adapted Adoption Laws 
 
I. Introduction 
 
To satisfy a dispute, King Solomon famously ordered that an infant whose maternity was 
claimed by two different women be split in two.
1
 The apparent principle of justice is a simple 
one: when evidence of rightful ownership is lacking, the property shall be divided equally 
between the two claimants.
2
 This proved difficult, however, when the “property” to be divided 
was an infant. 
In 2016, about three thousand years after King Solomon’s reign,3 the application of the 
principles of justice and equity are no less complicated. We now have intellectual-property 
disputes, issues of digital content, the division of legal and equitable title, and the confused-law-
student’s nightmare—the rule against perpetuities.4 But what happens when even contemporary 
principles fail to resolve such disputes? How does one “split the baby” in the modern world? 
While there are certainly a litany of unresolved issues in American jurisprudence, one issue lies 
at the intersection of reproductive law, property law, contract law, and general issues of equity: 
the adoptability of frozen embryos. 
The primary question is whether a frozen embryo should be adoptable by a donee-parent 
for the purpose of implanting that embryo and bringing a child to term. When a couple 
undergoes in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), a process by which eggs are fertilized outside of the 
                                                        
1
 See 1 King 3:16-28. 
2
 Of course, the true principle illustrated by the biblical narrative was King Solomon’s wisdom. He intended to fetter 
out the false mother, with no intention of actually splitting the baby. Id. 
3
 Matt Stefon, Solomon: King of Israel, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Solomon, (noting that “some scholars claim to have discovered artifacts that 
corroborate the biblical account of [Solomon’s] reign in the early 10th century”) (last visited May 5, 2016). 
4
 For some good examples of modern legal issues, see Law and Contemporary Problems, DUKE LAW, available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/all_issues.html (last visited May 5, 2016). 
 2 
female reproductive system, there are frequently excess embryos created.
5
 Because the first 
attempt at implantation of the fertilized egg often fails, the process leads to more embryos than 
would normally be implanted—usually about seven embryos in total.6 As a result of this process 
playing out repeatedly over time, there are currently about 600,000 cryogenically frozen embryos 
that are theoretically ready for implantation.
7
 Providing infertile couples the opportunity to adopt 
those hundreds of thousands of embryos would address two problems simultaneously: the 
disposition of excess embryos, and the struggle of infertility for adopting couples.
8
 
These embryos, however, raise unique legal problems. State law considers them to be 
property that, while distributed in the event of a divorce,
9
 cannot be purchased by prospective 
parents.
10
 An embryo can be implanted and may come to term, but the family to whom the baby 
may be born cannot adopt that embryo upon implantation.
11
 The embryo may be implanted, but 
it is unclear when that fetus becomes an adoptable person under state law.
12
 Each of these issues 
must be resolved before a comprehensive law regarding embryo adoption could be enacted. To 
that end, this paper will examine the law regarding frozen embryos and the currently existing 
“twilight zone” surrounding their donation, implantation, and adoption.13 
But these legal quandaries are not the most pressing issues—and certainly they are not 
the most human issues inherent in the problem. There is a great uncertainty in the minds of 
parents-to-be seeking the implantation of an embryo. In a real sense, the recipient-woman 
                                                        
5
 See infra Section II.B. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Embryo Adoption, OFFICE OF POPULATION AFFAIRS, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryo-
adoption (last visited May 5, 2016). 
8
 Embryo Adoption & Donation: An Act of Love, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, 
http://www.embryoadoption.org. 
9
 See infra Section II.C. 
10
 See infra notes 163-54 and accompanying text. 
11
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.26(1)(e) (requiring the adoptee’s birth certificate to make adoption legal). 
12
 See infra Section II.C. 
13
 See infra Parts II-III. 
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endeavors to biologically implant a piece of “property” into her body over which she holds a set 
of insufficient legal rights. Because the transfer of embryos is accomplished according to 
contract law, a woman who receives an implanted embryo is subject to the range of claims that 
accompanies any transfer by contract.
14
 The basis of Roe v. Wade
15
 and its progeny rests on the 
notion that a woman has autonomy over her body. Traditionally, this rationale has been used to 
substantiate the so-called right to an abortion. But surely the converse should be true; if a woman 
has a right to abort a fetus, she has the corresponding right to adopt and develop an embryo as a 
person, not just as “property.”16 
Each of these complications will be discussed in more detail below. And, ultimately, after 
an examination of the relevant areas of law on this important topic, this paper proposes a 
practical, yet unavoidably controversial solution to the issue: the granting of full adoption rights 
to parents after the successful implantation of an embryo in the donee-mother. 
II. Background  
 Put most simply, this paper advocates for recognition of adoption rights for the recipients 
of donated embryos. Before moving further in that advocacy, though, a few notes will be helpful. 
First, the author uses the term “embryo adoption” to refer to the process by which embryos are 
transferred to grantees, but this is actually a misnomer—one cannot legally adopt an embryo, as 
will be explained below.
17
 Second, because the problems surrounding embryos are nearly 
limitless, this paper will not analyze: the authority for implantation (i.e., who chooses whether a 
woman may use certain embryos for implantation), stem-cell research, the ethics of IVF, the 
                                                        
14
 For a list of remedies available under most contracts, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 345 (1981). 
15
 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
16
 See infra Subsection III.C. 
17
 That is, embryo adoption doesn’t actually exist; the process is, instead, a donative transfer. Because this paper 
advocates for embryo adoption, and because the term is shorter than “the donative transfer by which the donor 
transfers to the donee,” the author uses “embryo adoption” throughout. See infra Section II.C.  
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ethics of embryo disposal, or how courts should resolve divorce disputes surrounding frozen 
embryos.
18
  
Finally, a note on terminology: throughout the literature and judicial opinions on frozen 
embryos, frozen embryos are referred to as pre-zygotes,
19
 pre-embryos,
20
 blastocysts,
21
 and 
embryos. This paper will consistently use the term “embryo” to refer to the result of the IVF 
process. Whether the cells have been allowed to divide for three days, five days, or seven days is 
largely irrelevant simply because any dispute concerning the embryo is based in the same basic 
issue: the frozen material, assumed ready for implantation, is the result of two biologically 
distinct human beings, and it is not yet implanted.
22
 
A. The Core of a Complex Issue 
 At the center of the issue of embryo adoption is the divide between the biological parents 
and the birth parents.
23
 As an imperfect analogy, frozen embryos that are donated and implanted 
are akin to the division of legal and equitable title of property in a trust
24—except in the case of 
an embryo, it is a division between the biological parents and the donee-mother through whom 
the embryo is implanted, gestated, and birthed.
25
 This distinction is what creates this complex 
                                                        
18
 Though some of these topics help to advance the conversation, they are not directly related to embryo adoption. 
An analysis that tries to cover some or most of those topics would surely become overly difficult to manage. 
19
 See Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998). 
20
 Madeleine Schwartz, Who Owns Pre-Embryos?, The New Yorker (Apr. 28, 2015), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos. 
21
 Richard Sherbahn, IVF, In Vitro Fertilization with Blastocyst Culture and Day 5 Transfer, Adv. Fert. Cnt. of 
Chicago, http://www.advancedfertility.com/blastocy.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
22
 See Schwartz, supra note 20. 
23
 Therese O’Neill, Inside the rise of embryo adoption, THE WEEK (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://theweek.com/articles/443081/inside-rise-embryo-adoption. 
24
 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2, cmt. d (2003) (“Although trust beneficiaries have equitable title, a trustee's title 
to trust property may be either legal or equitable.”) 
25
 Id. (writing, “The Overlake Clinic keeps costs low by offering mainly medical procedures, which go for around 
$7,000, not counting diagnostics, travel fees, and medications. But here's the catch: Although the Kershners were 
able to look at anonymous profiles of donors, there is no other contact between adoptive parents and biological 
ones.”) 
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issue at the intersection of biology and the law.
26
 It is an issue of biology because IVF and frozen 
embryos are part of a system that takes the combined DNA from two human beings and 
artificially implants it into another woman’s uterus.27 Yet, it is an issue of law because parties to 
the biological process do not always agree, and they look to the courts to resolve their conflict.
28
 
The law attempts to provide certainty so that courts may settle those disputes consistently and 
fairly, but the biology at issue does not readily conform to our legal system.
29
 And no court has 
the power to change the biological function of DNA—courts must simply address the realities of 
nature, applying the law as straightforwardly as possible.
30
  
This is particularly apparent in the disposition of frozen embryos and, as a parallel, in 
issues surrounding surrogacy.
31
 Gestational surrogacy corresponds to the issues inherent in 
embryo adoption
32
 because it is a process by which a female, who is not intending to raise the 
child, accepts an embryo into her uterus for the purpose of bringing that child to term. She then 
gives birth to the child, relinquishing to the biological parents any parental rights.
33
 In gestational 
surrogacy, a couple provides both the sperm and the egg, which is fertilized through IVF, and the 
surrogate provides the suitable uterine environment for gestation.
34
 
                                                        
26
 See generally J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
27
 See infra Section II.B [IVF Process]. 
28
 See generally J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. 
29
 Id. 
30
 See infra Section II.C. 
31
 Id. 
32
 There is another widely-known case out of New Jersey, Matter of Baby M., where the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that the surrogate mother, and not the mother named in the surrogacy contract, was the legal parent. Matter of 
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 411, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (1988). This paper does not focus on that case because, unlike 
cases of embryo adoption, Matter of Baby M. involved a situation in which the biological father artificially 
inseminated the surrogate, instead of creating an embryo using the adoptive mother’s ovum and the adoptive 
father’s sperm. That is, the child was biologically one-half the surrogate, instead of being one hundred percent 
biologically the adoptive parent’s child. Id. 
33
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.854. 
34
 Id. 
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Foreseeably, surrogacy presents complications. According to most family-law 
jurisprudence, a birth mother is presumed the legal mother of any child born to her.
35
 In J.R. v. 
Utah, for example, two biological parents underwent IVF to create embryos that would be 
implanted into a surrogate mother.
36
 The surrogate mother gestated the child and gave birth, but 
the state refused to list the child’s biological parents as mother and father on the birth certificate, 
due to a statutory presumption to name the birth mother as the legal mother.
37
 The court in J.R. 
did ultimately hold that the biological parents were, in fact, entitled to be listed as the mother and 
father based on the constitutionally protected right of procreation, among other things.
38
 
But problems remain, as the prospect of embryo adoption compounds the complications 
inherent in surrogacy. The IVF process, explained below, creates a set of embryos to be 
implanted into a woman’s uterus.39 Because excess embryos are created, couples seek to adopt 
those embryos as their own and implant them into the donee-mother’s uterus.40 In a simple 
situation, the biological donors give the embryo to the donees, the donee-mother implants the 
embryo, and the baby gestates.
41
 In one sense, it is the converse of J.R. v. Utah.
42
 Instead of a 
biological donor using a surrogate and maintaining parental rights, the biological donor 
                                                        
35
 This issue is addressed at length in J.R. v. Utah: “Pregnancy and childbirth have physiological and psychological 
impacts upon the person experiencing the pregnancy and giving birth to the child, whatever the genetic particulars 
may be. Life is process, and this extraordinary process of human childbirth implicates the fundamental procreative 
rights of the birth mother as well as those of the mother and father whose best efforts at procreation have furnished 
the embryo. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 339 N.J.Super. 495, 772 A.2d 948, 952–54 (2000); Alayna Ohs, Note, The 
Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 Hastings Const. 
L.Q. 339, 355–61 (2002) (gestational surrogacy implicates fundamental procreative rights of surrogate mother).” 
261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2002). 
36
 Id. at 1270. 
37
 Id. at 1271. 
38
 Id. at 1293. 
39
 See Section II.B. 
40
 See Frequent Questions: Adopting Parents, Embryo Adoption Awareness Cntr., 
http://www.embryoadoption.org/faqs/adopting.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
41
 Id. 
42
 See generally J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
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relinquishes parental rights, the donee-mother births the baby, and the donee-parents assume the 
parental rights of the child.
43
 
Yet, as the court indicated in J.R., there are a slew of competing rights in the IVF 
context.
44
 The state has an interest in maintaining family bonds, the donee-parents have an 
interest in their connection with a baby born to them, and the biological parents have an interest 
in children of their joint DNA.
45
 Problematically, caring parents are currently left without a 
solution to these competing rights.
46
 It is time, then, for state law to provide adoption rights to 
donee-parents at the point of successful embryo implantation, thereby resolving the web of legal 
issues inherent in the process.
47
 
B. The IVF Process 
 As the name implies, in vitro fertilization occurs in vitro, meaning “in an artificial 
environment rather inside a living body.”48 In IVF, that artificial environment is most often a test 
tube and a petri dish.
49
 The process begins by stimulating egg growth through a hormone 
regimen given to the donor-mother.
50
 Instead of releasing just one egg per month, the hormones 
ensure that the donor-mother will release several eggs.
51
 Then, through an outpatient procedure, 
                                                        
43
 Id.; see J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
44
 J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-91. 
45
 Id. 
46
 See Frequent Questions, supra note 40. (noting, “The most significant legal issue associated with embryo 
donation and adoption relates to, 1.) the unsettled nature of embryo adoption law, and 2.) the contractual agreements 
used to legally bind donor and recipient couples.”) 
47
 See infra Part III. 
48
 In vitro, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
49
 See Nivin Todd, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, WedMD.com, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-
reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
50
 In vitro fertilization, U.S. NAT. LIB. OF MED., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm 
51
 Id. 
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eggs are harvested from the donor-mother and sperm is collected from the donor-father.
52
 The 
sperm is then mixed with the eggs in vitro, and the sperm fertilizes
53
 the egg.
54
  
This whole process is performed within three to five days after the initial retrieval of the 
egg.
55
 After the egg begins to divide in vitro, several fertilized eggs, now embryos, are implanted 
into the hopeful mother’s uterus.56 Because IVF is most often done in cases of apparent 
infertility, the implantation of more than one egg helps to increase the chances of a successful 
pregnancy.
57
After about six days, the embryo forms a physical attachment with the wall of the 
uterus.
58
 In fact, at that point, “a vascular connection to the mother is formed,” such that the 
embryo and the mother are biologically intertwined.
59
 As discussed below, this is a critical 
point—and it highlights the major issue.60 If embryo is a donated one, the donee-mother has 
become biologically intertwined with the embryo, yet, until birth, holds no parental rights over 
the child now gestating in utero.
61
 Of course, not every implantation is successful, regardless of 
whether it occurs in the donor- or donee-mother’s uterus.62 So, after the IVF process is complete, 
there are often excess embryos that are cryogenically frozen for later use in the event that the 
                                                        
52
 Id. 
53
 As a precaution, many facilities perform intracytoplasmic sperm injection to ensure the fertilization of several 
eggs. In this process, a syringe and pipette system is used to inject sperm directly into individual eggs, which are 
then allowed to divide into the first stages of an embryo. Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Embryo Implantation After IVF, ADV. FERT. CNT. OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.advancedfertility.com/implantation.htm (last visited My 6, 2016). 
59
 Id. 
60
 See supra Section III.C. 
61
 See infra Section II.B. 
62
 See IVF Success Rates: In Vitro Fertilization Statistics, ADV. FERT. CNT. OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivf-success-rates.htm (last visited May 6, 2016). 
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initial implantation fails.
63
 It is precisely those excess embryos that have led to such problems in 
the areas of prenuptial agreements, divorce, medical research, and, most recently, adoption.  
C. Current Law Regarding Embryo Adoption 
The complexity of this issue is compounded by the lack of federal jurisdiction over most 
family-law matters.
64
 Adoption and the corresponding legal processes are mostly adjudicated at 
the state level, meaning any overly broad statements will be, at best, partially inaccurate.
65
 With 
that in mind, I will use Michigan as my example state, with the law of several other states 
applied to the analysis. Michigan sides with the majority of states in its adoption-law 
jurisprudence, making it a representative example-state.
66
 
Although Michigan adoption law is well developed, there is little Michigan law regarding 
embryos or embryo adoption.
67
 The only relevant statutory provision is a section of the Michigan 
Constitution governing the use of human stem cells for research.
68
 Due to this void, this analysis 
considers other relevant sources: tangential Michigan case law; Michigan legislation that may 
affect embryo adoption; and the statutory and case law of other states that may serve to influence 
Michigan jurisprudence. Although Michigan courts have not specifically addressed “embryo 
adoption,” couples often donate the excess embryos resulting from the IVF process to fertility 
clinics, and courts have adjudicated disputes arising from those donations.
69
  
 
                                                        
63
 Becky A. Ray, Embryo Adoptions: Thawing Inactive Legislatures With A Proposed Uniform Law, 28 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 423, 427. 
64
 See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 950. 
65
 Id. 
66
 See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Family Law, Adoption, CENGAGE LEARNING, available at 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/Blob/I9c5aa5255b5411de9b8c850332338889.pdf. 
67
 Embryo Recipients: Legal Issues, THE FERTILITY CENTER, http://www.fertilitycentermi.com/treatment-
options/embryo-recipients/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
68
 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
69
 Stratford v. Stratford, No. 300925, 2012 Mich. App. Lexis 605, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012) (holding that 
both husband and wife have an interest in the excess embryos). 
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1. How Embryos are Currently “Transferred” 
Although the cases are quite complex, courts historically do not prohibit the donation of excess 
embryos, though they do hesitate to compel such a donation.
70
 Rather, it is the donee’s acceptance of the 
embryo that poses the greatest legal problem because the embryo holds a status somewhere between 
“property” and “person.”71 A frozen embryo maintains such a confused status because of its unique 
properties.
72
 It has the potential to be implanted and to grow into a baby that will be born. In its frozen 
state, however, it can be donated, destroyed, forgotten, or even be subject to prenuptial agreements.
73
 
The analysis therefore begins with how courts have ruled in conflicts of which frozen embryos were the 
subject. 
 a. Three Approaches to Embryo Disposition 
There are three generally accepted theories on embryo disposition: the contract approach, 
the contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach, and the balancing approach.
74
 The Appellate 
Court of Illinois, in Szafranski v. Dunston, elaborated on each, beginning with the contract 
approach: “Under [the contract] approach, courts will enforce contracts governing the disposition 
of pre-embryos which were entered into at the time of in vitro fertilization, so long as they do not 
violate public policy.”75 The benefit of this approach, like other contract-based transactions, is 
the certainty that it provides without court intervention.
76
 The disadvantage to being bound by 
contract, however, is the societal harm that could arise from such a transaction.
77
 That is the 
                                                        
70
 See Stratford, No. 300925, 2012 Mich. App. Lexis 605, at *2 (issue arising because trial court was unwilling to 
compel donation, instead using permissive “may” in its order). 
71
 See infra Section II.D. 
72
 Id. 
73
 See Stratford, No. 300925, 2012 Mich. App. Lexis 605, at *1. 
74
 Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
75
 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
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couple has essentially bound itself to a contract that governs a fundamentally personal area: 
conceiving and giving birth to children.  
The second available approach is “contemporaneous mutual consent.” This approach 
dictates:  
[N]o embryo should be used by either partner, donated to another patient, 
used in research, or destroyed without the [contemporaneous] mutual consent of 
the couple that created the embryo . . . . [A]dvance instructions would not be 
treated as binding contracts. If either partner has a change of mind about 
disposition decisions made in advance, that person's current objection would take 
precedence over the prior consent . . . . When the couple is unable to agree to any 
disposition decision, the most appropriate solution is to keep the embryos where 
they are—in frozen storage. Unlike the other possible disposition decisions—use 
by one partner, donation to another patient, donation to research, or destruction—
keeping the embryos frozen is not final and irrevocable. By preserving the status 
quo, it makes it possible for the partners to reach an agreement at a later time.
78
 
 
The ostensible objective of the contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach is to recognize and 
adapt to the changing circumstances that impact the decisions of would-be parents.
79
 In a strictly 
enforced contract, a divorcing couple could be bound to dispose of embryos in violation of the 
donor-mother or donor-father’s deeply held desire to maintain the potential for life.80 The 
mutual-consent approach, however, avoids binding that couple to a decision they may later 
regret; it allows the couple to revise its decision based on changed circumstances. The contract 
approach, on the other hand, creates certainty unavailable through mutual consent.
81
  
 Finally, some courts have recognized a balancing approach in embryo disposition. Under 
this theory, “courts enforce contracts between the parties, at least to a point, then balance their 
interests in the absence of an agreement.”82 This approach would seem to strike a balance 
between strict contract and mutual consent, allowing the court to intervene where the couple 
                                                        
78
 Id. at 510-511 (emphasis added). 
79
 See id. 
80
 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
81
 Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506. 
82
 Id. at 512. 
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cannot agree and the contract violates public policy.
83
 As the court in Szafranski noted, however, 
this approach fails to provide the benefits of either theory.
84
 It erodes the certainty of enforcing a 
clear contract while also failing to recognize the changing mutual desire of the parties.
85
 That is, 
the couple is left with neither the contract nor the ability to make the decision by consent—the 
court makes the decision for them.
86
 Ultimately, then, the Szafranski court accepted the most 
popular view: disposition by contract.
87
  
  b. The Majority Standard for Disposition  
Many of the courts that have considered embryo disposition have honored the contract 
executed by the couple prior to IVF. For example, as in Szafranksi, the court in Kass v. Kass held 
that the couple’s prior decision, which had been recorded in a contract with a fertility clinic, 
should control.
88
 The married couple in Kass was unable to get pregnant and underwent IVF, 
signing a packet of consent forms and contracts at the IVF clinic.
89
 The mother’s eggs were 
extracted and fertilized, resulting in nine embryos.
90
 Only three weeks later, though, the couple 
was preparing to divorce.
91
 The woman, contrary to the consent forms signed at the IVF clinic, 
sought to implant the embryos post-divorce, while the man sought the donation of the embryos 
for research.
92
 
Ultimately, the highest court in New York, relying on other state-court decisions, upheld 
the pre-IVF agreement in recognition of its expression of the parties’ desires at the time of 
                                                        
83
 See id. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. at 515. 
88
 Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998) 
89
 Id. at 559-60. 
90
 Id. at 560. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
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execution.
93
 The court held that “[a]dvance agreements as to disposition [of embryos] would 
have little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the [divorcing] parties continued to 
agree. To the extent possible, it should be the progenitor . . . who by their prior directive makes 
this deeply personal life choice.”94 The clear implication of Kass is that reliance on the contract 
should be the controlling principle.
95
 Or, put another way, it seems that the court’s primary 
concern is recognizing that feelings do change post-contract, and that the very purpose of the 
contract is to bind the parties even if they do not “continue[] to agree.”96 In that sense, the court 
is interested in predictability, a concept that will form the core of the analysis below.
97
 
2. Adoption Law 
Many embryo-donation programs use the term “embryo adoption” to describe the process 
by which donees receive frozen embryos from donors.
98
 “Embryo adoption” implies that the 
embryo is being legally adopted by the donee, but this really does not comport with adoption law 
in most states,
99
 including Michigan.
100
 Even if the embryo were considered a legal person,
101
 it 
may not be “adopted” because an adoptive parent may not adopt unborn children.102 As in 
Szafranski and Kass, then, embryo disposition occurs through contracts instead of through the 
adoption process.
103
  
                                                        
93
 Id. at 567. 
94
 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 566 (emphasis added). 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 See Part III. 
98
 Embryo Adoption & Donation: An Act of Love, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, 
http://www.embryoadoption.org. 
99
 See 50 State Statutory Surveys, supra note 66. 
100
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.21 (beginning of Michigan adoption code). 
101
 As discussed below, making every embryo a legal person is nearly impossible in the face of Roe and its progeny. 
102
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.26(1)(e) (requiring the adoptee’s birth certificate to make adoption legal). 
103
  See Subsection II.B.1.a,b. 
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In fact, even “embryo adoption agencies,” such as Hands Across the Water (“HATW”) in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, are compelled to utilize contracts for embryo donation and acceptance.
104
 
According to HATW, “[t]he adoption agreement and relinquishment forms are legal contracts 
between you and your genetic family. As there are no laws regarding adoption of embryos, we 
have created the contract to match the current position of the courts that the embryos are 
property.”105 HATW thus makes clear that it is not truly engaged in adoption.106 Another 
program in California operates in a similar way, providing a contractual relationship between the 
parties.
107
 The probate court is not involved, and the embryo is transferred to the donee through a 
traditional donative transfer.
108
 
Though the difference between transfer by contract and transfer by adoption may seem 
semantic, it is actually profoundly important. In many states, Michigan included, adoption 
affords the child (and parent) with certain legal rights, including designating the child as 
presumptive heir of the parent, giving the child the parents’ family name, and disclosing the 
child’s health and medical records.109 The Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 
provides a synopsis of the adoption process whereby such rights are afforded: First, the 
prospective parent submits a petition to the court to adopt a specific child.
110
 The petition must 
be filed with a document supporting adoption, such as a court order or consent of the biological 
                                                        
104
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parent.
111
 Then, the court orders an investigation into the prospective parent to ensure that the 
adoptee is protected through the adoption.
112
 Finally, as DHS writes: 
Following receipt of a completed report of investigation and satisfied that the 
adoptee’s best interests are served, the court will issue an order terminating the 
rights of the parent, [or other temporary guardian]. The court makes the adoptee a 
ward of the court, orders placement in adoption, and assigns a child-placing 
agency, DHS or an agent of the court to supervise/monitor the adoptive 
placement.
113
 
 
After a six-month probationary period, if the court is satisfied that the placement is in the 
“adoptee’s best interest,” it enters a final order of adoption.114 At that point, the adoptee is the 
legal child of the adoptive parent.
115
 Notably, however, the termination of the rights of the 
biological parent occurs only after the finalization of the adoption.
116
 And, again, that process 
cannot begin until the birth of the child.
117
 This is significant, because it means that the donee-
mother has implanted a child in her uterus over which she has absolutely no parental rights, even 
if the biological parents have donated the frozen embryo. 
3. Other States’ Law on Embryo Adoption 
Unlike Michigan, a minority of states have passed legislation to regulate embryo 
donation and adoption. Louisiana has taken the most proactive approach in defining embryos.
118
 
By statute, “[a]n in vitro fertilized human ovum as a juridical person is recognized as a separate 
entity apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is housed or stored.”119 The statute then 
regulates that “juridical person” by providing guidance for inheritance, destruction of the 
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embryo, and the responsibilities of the physician.
120
 Most notably, the Louisiana law makes the 
physician the temporary guardian of the juridical person until implantation can occur in the 
adoptive parent.
121
 No other state legislation appears to provide such guardianship for frozen 
embryos. 
Also, in 2010, Georgia passed the “Option of Adoption Act” for the purpose of 
encouraging the adoption of embryos.
122
 This statute specifies that:  
A legal embryo custodian may relinquish all rights and responsibilities for an 
embryo to a recipient intended parent prior to embryo transfer. A written contract 
shall be entered into between each legal embryo custodian and each recipient 
intended parent prior to embryo transfer for the legal transfer of rights to an 
embryo and to any child that may result from the embryo transfer. The contract 
shall be signed by each legal embryo custodian for such embryo and by each 
recipient intended parent.
123
  
 
Regrettably, although Georgia’s proactivity may be applauded, it calls for transfer by contract 
instead of adoption.
124
 But, again, not every state has enacted legislation to address the issue in a 
similar way, or in any way at all. In most states, embryos have been given neither a legal status, 
nor the legal right to be adopted.
125
 
D. The Effect of Roe v. Wade and its Progeny on Embryo Adoption 
Importantly, on the first page of the Michigan DHS adoption guide discussed above,
126
 
there is a set of definitions.
127
 DHS defines “adoptee” as the “child or adult to be adopted.”128 In 
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the context of embryo adoption, defining “adoptee” as a “child or adult” is particularly 
problematic in light of Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
129
  
1. Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood 
The subject of embryo adoption would be, in one sense, much simpler if every embryo 
were deemed a natural legal person. Any natural legal person may be adopted with the proper 
elements of consent and court involvement, so the issue would essentially go away.
130
 The 
jurisprudence surrounding abortion, though, quite clearly forecloses that possibility.
131
  
Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood set the legal landscape for the abortion 
debate in the United States.
132
 As the Court said in Roe, “the word ‘person,’ as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”133 The Court in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, placing significant limits on Roe, went on to hold that “the State has legitimate interests 
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus 
that may become a child.”134 One will note that the State’s interest is not in the life of the fetus as 
a then-existing child, but rather in the potential for the embryo or fetus to become a child.
135
 Put 
another way, the State has a “profound interest in potential life” that is present as a fetus in the 
mother’s womb.136 The competing rights outlined in Casey and in Roe, of course, are the 
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mother’s “long recognized rights of privacy and bodily integrity.”137 In the context of the 
abortion debate, then, the two rights are at odds with one another.
138
 The State has a legitimate 
claim in the potential life of the child, and the mother has a legitimate claim in the right to 
control her own body—up to and including terminating the potential life.139 So, the impasse 
remains: the State’s interest lives in the mother’s body, and biology does not readily resolve that 
legal conundrum.
140
 Fortunately, as explained below, embryo adoption allows those two 
competing rights to be congruent and complementary.
141
 
2. Precedent for Embryos as Legal Persons 
 Though the Supreme Court has granted the right to an abortion, thereby foreclosing the 
argument that every embryo is a natural legal person,
142
 the law is not completely consistent in 
that principle. For example, in a majority of states, it is unlawful to kill an unborn child unless a 
doctor, at the request of the mother, performs the termination.
 143
  In fact, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals found that a defendant may assert “defense of a third person” where the defendant was 
protecting an unborn baby, holding: 
[I]n this state, the defense should also extend to the protection of a fetus, viable or 
nonviable, from an assault against the mother, and we base this conclusion 
primarily on the fetal protection act adopted by the Legislature in 1998. This act 
punishes individuals who harm or kill fetuses or embryos under various 
circumstances. [The law] sets forth penalties for harming a fetus or embryo during 
an intentional assault against a pregnant woman . . . . M.C.L. § 750.90b punishes 
an individual for harming or killing a fetus or embryo during an intentional 
assault against a pregnant woman without regard to the individual's intent or 
recklessness concerning the fetus or embryo. . . . The plain language of these 
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provisions shows the Legislature's conclusion that fetuses are worthy of 
protection as living entities as a matter of public policy.
144
 
 
Considering Roe’s holding that an unborn child is not a legal person, it is noteworthy that fetuses 
are “worthy of protection as living entities.145 So not only can an assailant be charged with the 
murder of an unborn fetus, but a defendant can assert that the fetus, viable or nonviable, is a 
person worth defending.
146
 
E. Current Literature Regarding Embryo Adoption 
Given the complicated legal nature of frozen embryos, it is only appropriate that the 
journal literature has attempted to untangle the issue. Commentators have discussed the benefits 
of embryo donation,
147
 with some advocating for a uniform law to govern actual embryo 
adoptions.
148
 That is, not only would the child be adopted post-birth, but each individual embryo 
would be adopted by the donee, presumably meaning that an adoptive parent would be adopting 
between four and seven individual embryos in a given transaction.
149
 Others have examined the 
issues arising from the contractual agreements that bind couples during IVF, particularly in the 
divorce context.
150
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These theories and suggestions, along with the solution proposed by this paper, are 
discussed in detail in Part III. 
III. The Need for Embryo Adoption 
 Much can be and has been said about frozen embryos. And clearly couples, whether for 
infertility or other personal reasons, could benefit from embryo adoption.
151
 But no analysis to 
the author’s knowledge has provided a solution that bridges the gap between the Roe/Casey 
jurisprudence and the desire for would-be parents to successfully adopt frozen embryos from 
donors. Authors seem to take one of two positions: 1) embryos should pass strictly by contract
152
 
or 2) embryos, in their frozen form, should be adoptable.
153
 
 Both of these approaches, however, fail to consider several core issues. First, embryos 
passing by contract cannot be adopted prior to implantation.
154
 Because state law precludes the 
adoption of unborn children, the parents who implant the embryos are essentially implanting an 
organism with no legal status into the mother’s body, with no assurance of adoptability. 155 Even 
if the donors are willing to relinquish all rights, parental rights cannot vest with the adoptive 
parents until birth.
156
 Secondly, it seems untenable to ask parents to “adopt” four to seven 
embryos in one moment, knowing that the couple is likely to implant only one or two of those 
now-adopted embryos.
157
 Given the current web of state laws, case law, literature, and public 
policy surrounding the issue, what is the solution? 
 The most appropriate solution is to create a legal right of adoptability at the point of 
successful implantation. This provides a middle ground between full embryonic personhood and 
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the “twilight zone” wherein a mother who implants an embryo is hosting a fetus, but cannot 
exercise parental rights over the child until birth.   
A. Why Adoption-at-Implantation is Better than Contract 
Because the IVF process involves the creation of several embryos,
158
 there will usually be 
the potential for disposing of at least some embryos by contract.
159
 According to a sample 
agreement posted on an embryo adoption website, the donors will “transfer any and all 
ownership and parental rights of the embryos”160 to the donees. This phrase indicates the special 
legal status of embryos. Whereas property traditionally carries no “parental” rights, the embryo’s 
special legal status requires (or at least suggests) that parental rights may develop from the 
implantation of the organism.
161
 
But there are problems with transferring such unique material by contract. The 
fundamental problem is that, to create a binding contract, the parties must exchange valuable 
consideration.
162
 In a traditional contract, consideration would take the form of money or goods. 
Under Michigan law, however, it is unlawful to sell embryos for stem-cell research,
163
 and courts 
would likely find the sale of embryo for implantation unlawful, as well.
164
 It is also a felony, 
under Michigan law, to exchange valuable consideration in connection with an adoption.
165
 
Essentially, then, an effort to draft a binding agreement for embryo adoption forms a paradox. If 
the party sells the embryo as property, it violates the state constitution.
166
 But, if the parties 
                                                        
158
 Id. 
159
 See supra note 75. 
160
 Embryo Donation Agreement – Sample 1, MIRACLES WAITING, 
http://www.miracleswaiting.org/agreemsample1.html (last visited July 17, 2014) (emphasis added). 
161
 Id. 
162
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 1, 71 (1981). 
163
 See MICH. CONST. art. 1 §27. 
164
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54 (prohibiting the exchange of consideration for adoption). 
165
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54 (making adoption for valuable consideration a felony). 
166
 See MICH. CONST. art. 1 §27. 
 22 
exchange valuable consideration to adopt the embryo, they have committed a felony.
167
 Thus, to 
be binding, the contract must provide for a donation while not constituting a “sale.”  
To solve this problem, the donee and donor could execute a contract containing an 
exchange of conditional promises.
168
 According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, “Courts will 
not ordinarily inquire into the adequacy of consideration and rescission of the contract for 
inadequacy of consideration will not be ordered unless the inadequacy was so gross as to shock 
the conscience . . . . It is well-settled that a conditional promise may form adequate 
consideration.”169 But even under this relaxed standard for consideration, it is unclear what 
promises the donor and donee would exchange. Certainly the donor promises to relinquish rights 
to the donee, but what conditional promise does the donor seek in exchange? The donor could 
promise to voluntarily transfer the frozen embryo to the donee, so long as the donee promises to 
provide visitation rights to the donor. Given the nature of IVF and the purpose of the adoption, 
though, it seems unlikely that continued visitation would be in the interest of either donor or 
donee in most cases.
170
 Further, even if a contract for the donation of the embryo were legally 
enforceable, it fails to provide the donee-parents any parental rights over the child until birth.
171
 
B. Which Disposition Theory Should Control? 
 As discussed in Part II, courts have used three methods of disposition: contract, 
contemporaneous mutual consent, and balancing.
172
 Although these theories are particularly 
relevant to the context of divorce, for which courts must resolve a dispute between two parties, 
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they become even more important to embryo adoption.
173
 Before the court in Szafranski were 
two parties who underwent IVF, only to end their relationship a month later.
174
 Post-separation, 
the male donor sought to enjoin the female donor from implanting the embryos, alleging that it 
would compel him to be a father.
175
 The court ultimately endorsed that the contractual 
approach,
176
 but the case illustrates a serious problem in contracting for the implantation of an 
embryo. If the couple had decided to donate the embryos, one of the donors could have had a 
similar change of heart after implantation in a donee-mother. Certainly, a court would attempt to 
weigh the policy consideration of allowing the donor to have control over an implanted embryo.  
But is nevertheless true that the donee-parents have no legal parental rights over the child and 
could be subject to a claim against the embryo under either the contemporaneous-mutual-consent 
or balancing approach.
177
 
 Under the contractual approach, the court would be less likely to honor any breach of the 
original disposition contract.
178
 Under a contemporaneous-mutual-consent standard, however, 
the will of the donors would play an important, and perhaps dangerous, role. Again, under this 
theory, “no embryo should be used by either partner, donated to another patient, used in research, 
or destroyed without the [contemporaneous] mutual consent of the couple that created the 
embryo.”179 More importantly, no prior agreements control.180 Presumably, this would be limited 
to implantation into the donor-mother, but the court is not clear about that.
181
 It even establishes 
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that the mutual consent extends to “donat[ion] to another patient.”182 If such consent is required 
before the embryo may be utilized, then it is plausible that the consent could be revoked after 
donation, even where that donation led to implantation in another woman. That is, the donor-
couple could conceivably “mutually consent” to revoke the donation of the embryo under a claim 
of biological parentage.
183
  
 The best solution to such a complicated issue is simply to make the adoption legally 
binding at the point of implantation. Initially, the embryo should be donated by contract, as it is 
currently.
184
 But at the point of implantation, the best method of eliminating complication is 
adoption, particularly because it provides rights to both the parents and child.
185
 Even if the 
biological-parent donors change their minds, the harm would be reduced; the frozen embryo 
could be simply returned to them prior to implantation. But if the biological-parent donors do 
fully relinquish their rights, then, at the point of implantation, the donee-parents could legally 
adopt the child and exercise parental rights over the child—just as any naturally conceiving 
parents would. 
Most importantly, any system of mutual consent or balancing should be abandoned in 
favor of predictability for the donee-parents.
186
 The parent would be protected from any attempts 
at revocation from the donors, and the child would be legally tied to the donee-parents.
187
 
Further, though not a legal issue, one should not ignore the more abstract question of the status 
of an embryo/fetus who has been transferred by contract, implanted, and yet is not adoptable by 
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the implanted mother.
188
 Does that mother have the right to choose the tests that the fetus 
undergoes? Or the right to authorize an in utero surgical procedure on the child? Such an 
undefined state-of-being for a fetus attached to a woman’s body should provide enough catalyst 
to allow for adoption-at-implantation. 
C. The Compatibility of Adoption-at-Implantation with Roe and Casey 
As discussed above, the principle concern of Roe, Casey, and other abortion cases centers 
on the competing rights of the government and the mother.
189
 In recognizing adoption-at-
implantation, however, courts would respect each of these competing rights.
190
 Though at first it 
may appear that adoption-at-implantation inherently provides the embryo with personhood, the 
exception could be carved out to sufficiently distinguish between an adoptable embryo and a full 
legal person.
191
 Because an implanted embryo grows just as any other fetus would, the rights at 
issue in Roe and Casey are still at play.
192
 The government has an interest in protecting the life of 
the potential person, and the mother has control over her own body, which, according to the 
Court, includes the right to abortion.
193
 Adoption-at-implantation would not affect those 
competing rights—the government could still seek to protect the fetus and the mother could 
control her body, regardless of whether the fetus growing inside of her is biologically her own.
194
 
In fact, the rights of donee-parents seeking adoption are congruent with the government’s 
interest to the extent that the donee-parents seek to give life to the frozen embryo, and the 
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government seeks to protect that same life.
195
 So the rights established in Roe are not only 
preserved, they are bolstered by adoption-at-implantation. 
 Even assuming that adopting an implanted embryo pushes the fetus too far into legal 
personhood, making the implanted fetus the child of the donee-mother is perfectly consistent 
with natural birth. To the author’s knowledge, not even the most pro-Roe advocate would 
contend that an abortion-eligible fetus is not the legal child of its parents while in the womb, if in 
fact the mother carrying the child is the biological parent. Laws prohibiting the killing of a fetus 
against the mother’s consent recognize that very fact; the child is a protectable person, even if 
the mother’s bodily autonomy competes with the State’s interest in that potential life.196 So, 
again, adoption-at-implantation actually makes the State’s interest and the mother’s interest 
compatible and even extends the mother’s choice in the matter. Unlike in the abortion context, 
the mother presumably underwent a consensual procedure to have the embryo artificially 
implanted, and she therefore shares the State’s interest in that potential life.197 
Further, recognizing adoption-at-implantation is consistent with a medically recognized 
successful IVF procedure. During IVF, the fertilized embryo is inserted directly into the donee-
mother uterus.
198
 And, as described above, the embryo forms “a vascular connection” with the 
mother at the point of implantation.
199
 Implantation is not simply another stage in the process—
rather, it is the biologically defined fusing of mother and embryo.
200
 Because the vascular 
connection is a scientifically recognized point of physical connection, the law should also 
recognize that point as a legitimate bright line for adoptability. In fact, shortly after the point of 
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implantation, the embryo begins to feed from the mother’s nutrients through the umbilical cord 
and developing placenta.
201
 There is therefore simply no reason for the law to refuse to recognize 
parental rights where biology recognizes such an intimate, physical connection between mother 
and child in utero. 
Unfortunately, as with any pregnancy, bringing a healthy baby to term is not 
guaranteed.
202
 Studies estimate between 750,000 and one million miscarriages and stillbirths 
occur each year.
203
 But whether the child will be born should not be a factor in deciding when 
the donee-parents are legally allowed to adopt a child growing inside of an adoptive mother. It 
would violate basic rights for the government to claim that parents of fetal children do not have 
parental rights over that child.
204
 As the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illinois, “The rights to 
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed ‘essential.’”205 It should be no different 
for a child conceived in vitro and, by the adoptive parents’ consent, implanted into the donee-
mother’s uterus.206 Except in cases of surrogacy,207 which is another complex topic left for 
another paper, the interests of a naturally conceiving biological mother and an IVF-conceiving 
adoptive mother are the same: they seek a parental bond with the child, both now and in the 
future.
208
 With no legally justifiable reason to keep the donee-parents from adopting the child, 
then, the law should allow for adoption of the embryo at the point of implantation. 
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D. Responding to Other Viewpoints on Embryo Adoption 
 As mentioned above, there are several competing views surrounding embryo adoption.
209
 
One of the most prolifically discussed is the contract view.  
 1. The Contract Approach 
Contracts are often at the core of divorce disputes, and courts are tasked with interpreting 
pre-divorce contracts more often than embryo-adoption contracts.
210
 The academic literature has 
also treated the issue at length, with many advocating for embryos to be addressed more strictly 
by contract.
211
 For example, one commentator argues that states should “require the donors and 
the clinic to sign an advanced dispositional agreement regarding the disposition of the donors' 
frozen embryos.”212 But, again, this concept will not work as applied to embryo adoption.213 
First, as noted above, it is unclear that a contract between a donor and a donee would be binding 
in the context of embryo adoption.
214
 Although the parties can exchange conditional promises, 
there seems to be nothing that the donee could promise without running afoul of public policy.
215
 
Second, even though the donor could relinquish all rights, the donee could not bind herself to 
implanting an embryo in her uterus. Not only does this violate reproductive choice,
216
 it is also 
against the law in several states to contract for surrogacy
217
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In Michigan, for example, a surrogacy contract governs “the implantation in a female of 
an embryo not genetically related to that female and subsequent gestation of a child by that 
female.”218 The broad scope of that definition would include embryo donation; after all, an 
implanted embryo is “not genetically related to that female,” and the female intends to gestate 
the child.
219
 Further, even in the most common-sense view, enforcing a contract based on the 
conditional promise of implantation would be impossible. No court would compel a woman to 
implant an embryo into her uterus on the grounds of specific performance of a contract.  
Instead, state law should simply allow the contract to control the transfer, and adoption 
law to control the gestation period after implantation. The contract should be premised on the 
donor promising to relinquish control and the donee promising to release all claims of liability 
against the donor.
220
 Then, at the point of implantation, adoption law should provide the donee-
parents with the right to adopt the growing embryo.
221
 This avoids a public-policy issue while 
still vesting the new parents with immediate parental rights.
222
  
2. The Adoption-at-Transfer Approach 
Another commentator advocates for adoption at the point of transfer to the donee. She 
argues for a model statute requiring:  
The donating parents shall be afforded the opportunity to select the intended 
parents to adopt their excess embryos . . . . The donating parents relinquish all 
rights, obligations, and interests with respect to the adopted embryos, including 
parental and inheritance rights, provided both consent in writing to the adoption. 
Provided the intended mother, and her spouse if she is married, both consent in 
writing to adopt the embryos and have them implanted, any resulting child will be 
the same as a naturally conceived child would be for that mother and her husband, 
for all legal intents and purposes.
223
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In this framework, the embryos are all adopted at the time of transfer, and the donee-parents 
must agree to “have them implanted.”224 But, again, such an agreement violates black-letter law 
in some states and runs contrary to public policy.
225
 What exactly would be a court’s task in 
enforcing such provision? Asking the bailiff to accompany the party in breach to a hospital to be 
implanted with an embryo? Surely that is not a workable solution. Further, a provision 
transferring all embryos immediately vests the donee-parents with several adopted children.
226
 
The IVF procedure typically creates six to seven embryos, and the excess would all be adopted 
by the donees at the time of transfer.
227
 Though such a model statute satisfies the goal of embryo-
adoption reform, it does not provide a reasonable means to do so. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Throughout this paper, the focus has been the core of the problem: the parental-rights 
“twilight zone” that exists after the implantation of a donated embryo.228 Courts, such as those in 
J.R. and Szafranksi have been left to consider complex biological issues.
229
 In J.R., the court had 
to determine parental rights as between the biological parents and the surrogate mother.
230
 In 
Szafranski, the court addressed a pre-IVF disposition agreement contested by a hopeful mother 
post-separation.
231
 In both cases, however, the court was left trying to fit a square peg in a round 
hole. There simply is no perfectly equitable way to resolve the complications of a woman 
hosting, in her own uterus, the biological child of another couple. With technology rapidly 
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advancing, though, it is imperative that state legislatures catch up.
232
 As observed earlier, only a 
few states have enacted legislation to address embryo adoption,
233
 but courts have been 
compelled to decide the disposition of embryos nonetheless.
234
  
 It is only a matter of time until the issues of legal parenthood in J.R. and of embryo 
disposition in Szafranski collide in the context of embryo adoption.
235
 As in J.R., embryo 
adoption involves the implantation of the DNA of two persons into a third party.
236
 By design, 
that third party becomes the adoptive mother.
237
 But even the literature on embryo adoption 
recognizes that donors of frozen embryos experience a psychological barrier to “giving up” their 
embryos for adoption.
238
 The Embryo Adoption Awareness Center says,  
Typically, placing or donating parents tend to use the term 'donation', while 
receiving or adopting couples tend to use the term 'adoption'. The basis for this is 
largely psychological. Donation is used in the sense of 'giving a gift' and offers an 
emotional separation from the embryos that the phrase 'placing for adoption' 
does not.
239
 
 
Given the psychological difficulty that donors have in relinquishing rights to embryos that are 
biologically theirs, it is foreseeable that a donor-couple would seek custody over a child 
successfully born to a donee-mother.
240
 In fact, in the United Kingdom, one such case has 
already been litigated.
241
 A same-sex couple contracted for the birth of a child by a surrogate 
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who subsequently refused to relinquish parental rights to the couple.
242
 The mother cited her 
duties as a breastfeeding mother, the intimacy that she had with the child, and her belief that the 
men would be unfit parents.
243
   
 The converse of such a situation seems reasonably imminent. Instead of the surrogate 
claiming custody, a biological parent, in spite of a written contract, may claim that the adoptive 
parents are unfit.
244
 And such a claim could proceed under the current post-birth adoption system 
precisely because unborn children cannot be adopted.  As a result of that prohibition on pre-birth 
adoption, there is no legal framework to protect the donee-parents from such a claim from the 
donors.
245
 
 This potential for the multiplication of complications seen in past litigation places a 
spotlight on the need for reform. Absent the swift adoption of a workable system, donees are 
ultimately left with pre-birth parental disputes, unenforceable contracts, uncertainty in the courts, 
and a “twilight zone” of parental rights as the child gestates in the donees uterus.246 Adoption-at-
implantation is the only system to remediate these complications and provide hopeful parents of 
adopted embryos the peace of mind that they deserve. 
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